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In a nuclear power plant, the last barrier under normal and accident operations is the containment 
building. This is normally constructed from concrete reinforced with steel bars, which are pre-
stressed to enhance the overall capability to withstand thermodynamic stresses like over-
pressurisation and high temperatures. The failure of this final barrier will lead to the release of 
radioactivity to the surrounding environment. To examine the effects of thermo-hydraulic stresses 
on PWR containment following a LOCA, a model is proposed with simulated scenarios performed 
at the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station as a case study. The accidents were simulated using the 
Koeberg engineering simulator to obtain the output data. The scenario for the proposed model 
correlates the critical mass flow from a double-ended guillotine break to the containment pressure 
and temperature increase. Different containment filtered venting systems (CFVS) are also 
investigated in this study as severe accident management systems. CFVS have historically been 
included in boiling water reactor (BWR) designs, but following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
accident, they are being introduced as severe accident management systems to manage the threat 
of containment over-pressurisation in pressurised water reactors (PWR). Finally, the rate of change 
in containment pressure and temperature is analysed and compared to literature, with the 
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1. Introduction
Nuclear power stations generate electricity by using the fission of nuclear fuel, uranium-235 and 
plutonium-239, to generate heat and in turn produce steam which is directed to the turbine. 
Radioactivity is the emission of ionizing radiation or particles caused by the spontaneous 
disintegration of atomic nuclei and therefore a by-product of the fission process. This radioactivity 
must be contained to protect the personnel, public and the environment from radioactive exposure 
[1]. In a PWR, similar to Koeberg Nuclear Power Station (KNPS) this radioactivity is contained by 
means of three barriers namely the fuel cladding, Reactor Coolant System (RCP) which is the primary 
system boundary and the containment building vessel. 
Figure 1: Illustration of the three radiological barriers at a PWR NPP [2] 
The first barrier is the fuel cladding which is made of zirconium alloy and contains the fission 
products and gases within the cladding during normal plant operation. It can withstand 
temperatures of up to 1850  oC and a pressure of 241 MPa [3]. 
The second barrier is the RCP primary system boundary. This includes the RCP coolant which is 
chemically controlled water used to transfer heat from the fuel to the steam generators, and is 
maintained within the piping and components. If there is a leak on the first barrier, the fuel cladding, 




the radioactivity can be contained or confined to only the second barrier, the RCP primary system 
boundary. 
The third barrier, the containment building, is considered to be a sealed vessel which can contain 
its contents up to a specified temperature and pressure. This refers to the containment structure 
made from reinforced concrete that is one meter thick and designed to contain the radioactivity in 
the event of an accident. The containment building is designed to withstand the impact of an 
airplane crash/missile. There are different designs of containment building structures with the main 
purpose of containing the radioactivity during normal operation and accident conditions. 
The general design of the containment building includes a cylindrical, steel lined, concrete 
pressure vessel with a hemispherical top closure and stepped flat bottom. The building encloses 
the reactor coolant system with the principal function of containing the mass and energy of the 
reactor coolant in the postulated event of a rupture in the reactor coolant piping (i.e., an assumed 
Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)). 
The design of the containment structure reflects a trade-off between internal volume, design 
pressure and cost. Current designs contain approximately two million cubic feet (56634 m3) of free 
volume and are designed for an internal gauge pressure of 4 bar [4]. Peak pressures for the 
maximum assumed LOCA can reach up to 4 bar and can occur within 1 minute. [1] 
Past operational experiences (OE) and lessons learned, in particular, with the recent accident at the 
Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, generated the need to evaluate and reflect on current and 
developing nuclear power plant designs. Some of these considerations are, but not limited to, the 
efficacy and adequacy of current acceptance criteria to safety related systems concerning the 
Structures, Systems and Components (SSC). 
During accidents, the last barrier to the radioactive product release into the atmosphere is the 
reactor containment building. All nuclear facilities are designed to manage design based accidents 
which are sometimes referred to as severe postulated accidents with, safety design systems like 
containment sprays, coolers, safety injection and Passive Auto-catalytic Recombiners (PAR), etc. 
When these above-mentioned safety design systems fail or malfunction during a severe accident or 
beyond design events, like with Fukushima-Daiichi, core degradation or damage is inevitable. 
Hydrogen would form in the reactor pressure vessel mainly due to high temperature zirconium-
steam reactions and can be released together with steam into the containment building where it 




will mix with the containment atmosphere. The residual heat of the radioactive isotopes combined 
with the hydrogen mixture continues to increase pressure and temperature for extended periods. 
This hydrogen mixture poses a big safety concern as it can lead to an explosive atmosphere and the 
containment building may lose its structural integrity due to over-pressurisation which will cause 
uncontrolled radioactive releases to the environment.   
Containment building structures undergo many stresses like thermal and pressure stresses. This 
dissertation will be evaluating the effects of thermal stresses on a containment building in the event 
of a Large Break LOCA in a PWR. The value of an added containment filtered venting system (CFVS) 
during this simulated scenario will also be evaluated. 
 
  




1.1 Problem Statement 
There has been a shift in the focus of nuclear safety following the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power 
station incident in 2011 especially with respect to beyond design based accidents and being 
prepared for them by adding additional measures like containment filtered venting systems. This 
motivated the investigation into ensuring the containment integrity following a postulated severe 
accident, i.e. LOCA.  
With a delay or failure of the designed safeguard system auto-actions, can the containment building 
heat and pressure absorption load in a severe postulated accident, like a Large Break Loss of Coolant 
Accident (LBLOCA) in a PWR system withstand and maintain its design purpose?  
This will be analysed using the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station as a case study.  
This dissertation will investigate the value of including a CFVS during these LBLOCA simulations in a 
PWR containment system. Different CFVS designs will also be evaluated and compared.   
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The aim of the dissertation is to evaluate the performance of a PWR nuclear containment building 
and offer a deeper understanding of the response to a LBLOCA. This will be attained by pursuing the 
main objectives of this study, which are to:  
1. Understand the basic construction of a PWR nuclear containment building and its purpose. 
2. Develop a thermodynamic model following a LOCA to simulate the pressure and 
temperature changes in the containment building. 
3. Evaluate the types of CFVS and their impact on the model. 
4. Examine the advantages and disadvantages of CFVS options. 
 
This dissertation will not be a justification for the use of a CFVS at the KNPS, nor will it cover the 
criteria for the selection of any CFVS, but rather investigate the inclusion to a PWR system as a 
severe accident management tool and to inform of the options available and in use around the 
world at present. 
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1.3 Background 
Both PWR and BWR type reactors employ the use of containment structures even though the 
designs differ between the two. In all cases, the containments are designed to sustain any static or 
dynamic loads that may be caused. This was not always the industry norm especially looking back 
to the Chernobyl incident of April 1986 with an RBMK type reactor which did not have a containment 
building or structure. The role of containment structures in the accident that happened at TMI 
(Three Mile Island) in March 1979 showed that the radioactivity can be contained within these 
containment structures limiting the harmful effects of radioactivity releases to the public and the 
environment.  
Figure 2: TMI containment vessel [5] 
Some containment structures are: 
 Steel spheres;
 Double wall reinforced, unlined or with a steel or epoxy liner;
 Double wall reinforced and pre-stressed concrete, unlined or with a steel or epoxy liner.
The design pressure and temperature are the two primary parameters used for determining the size 
of the containment structure. Thus, the design must be able to successfully manage the release of 




material and energy in excess of the design limits. This peak pressure should be determined on the 
basis of conservative assumptions in relation to the thermo-hydraulic characteristics. 
1.3.1 Containment structural design 
Numerous types of containment structure designs are in operation to date used by various utilities 
worldwide. The designs commonly used incorporate steel vessels or concrete vessels lined with 
steel plates. These steel vessels can be cylindrical or spherical in shape. Whereas, reinforced 
concrete vessels may occasionally be post-tensioned cylindrical shaped with hemispherical domes. 
The type of structure chosen by a utility is dependent on plant layout, site characteristics, and 
economic feasibility to alternate technology [6]. 
A typical Westinghouse pre-stressed concrete containment design is shown in Figure 3.  
  
Figure 3: A typical pre-stressed concrete containment [6]               
 
 




Figure 4 shows a typical cylindrical steel containment. 
 
Figure 4: A typical cylindrical steel containment [6] 
The inside face of the concrete shell, dome, and floor are steel plate lined to ensure a high degree 
of leak tightness. The cylindrical shell is pre-stressed by a post-tensioning system consisting of 
horizontal and vertical tendons. The dome has a two-way post-tensioning system. There are three 
buttresses equally spaced around the containment. Hoop tendons are anchored at buttresses 240 
degrees apart, bypassing the intermediate buttress. Each successive hoop is progressively offset 120 
degrees from the one beneath it. Another possible tendon arrangement includes U-tendons and 
hoops. A third system includes helicoidal tendons in opposite patterns. The foundation base slab is 
a concrete structure conventionally reinforced with the high-strength reinforcing steel. A 
continuous access gallery is provided beneath the base slab for the installation and inspection of 
vertical tendons [6]. The base liner of this design is installed on top of the structural slab covered 
with concrete for post-tension. The containment completely encloses the entire reactor and primary 
system and certain auxiliary safety systems. 




A pre-stressed concrete containment having a cylindrical shell, a hemispherical dome, and a flat 
base slab (with a pit) can be seen in Figure 5. 
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The BWR containment structure includes a dry well and a wet well, where a PWR does not contain 
any wells. A simplistic diagram can be seen in Figure 6 below. 
Figure 6: BWR and PWR containment vessels [7] 
These containment structures have many functions which include: 
 Radiation shielding;
 Provisions for personnel accessibility;
 Anchorage, support and protection of the reactor tank system and other equipment;
 Resistance to jet, pipe whip, and loads produced by emergency conditions;
 A boundary of wet-wells and pool structures, allowing communication between drywell and
wet-well (Mark II/second generation designs),
 Lateral stability for the containment;
 Transfer the containment loads to the foundation.
The loading on the containment structure includes: 
 Temperature transients and gradients,
 Safe shutdown earthquake loads,




 Internal (and external) missiles, 
 Mechanical loads from pipe rupture, 
 External pressures, 
 Winds and tornadoes. 
 
Particular severe accidents considered for the containment buildings include: 
 Over-pressurisation 
 Dynamic pressure (shock waves) 
 Internal missiles 
 External missiles 
 Melt-through 
 Bypass (equipment failure leading to the reactor coolant being released into the peripheral 
buildings or directly into the environment) 
 
Some containment structures have special features like vents for containment venting, if required, 
for controlled venting of gases or vapour to the atmosphere. This is to ensure that the containment 
structure integrity is maintained in case of a hydrogen release or buildup of steam pressure inside 
the containment structure. This is predominantly utilized in BWR systems. When hydrogen is 
released in the containment building, it can create an explosive mixture with air and cause an 
explosion which may destroy or damage the containment building structures.  
The scenario of the accidents that occurred at Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi will briefly be 
discussed below with the main emphasis on the role of the containment building vessel.  
 
1.3.2 Chernobyl Accident 
The Chernobyl Power Station situated in Pripyat, approximately 16 km northwest of the city of 
Chernobyl in Ukraine. The station consisted of four light water boiling type reactors, each capable 
of producing 1000 MW of electrical power. The Chernobyl nuclear accident happened on April 26th, 
1986 as a consequence of two subsequent explosions in one of the four reactors of the Chernobyl 




Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Explosions were caused by a few factors, but mostly by human error and 
technical deficiencies. Chernobyl utilized the RBMK-1000 boiling water type reactors and below are 
some of the design features that influenced the sequence of the accident [8]: 
 Positive void coefficient of reactivity 
 The design of the control and safety rods 
 Speed of insertion of the emergency protection rods 
 Control of power 
 Instrumentation indicating the reactivity margin 
 Size of the reactor core 
 Capability to alter or bypass safety systems, plant trips and alarms 
 Sub-cooling of the inlet water 
 Primary coolant system 
 No Containment building  
  
Investigation and analysis indicate the onset of the accident was initiated from an after-hours safety 
test which simulated a station blackout power failure scenario. During the test, the safety 
systems were intentionally turned off. The engineers at Chernobyl wanted to determine the 
duration and amount of power a spinning turbine would provide at lower reactor power to certain 
systems in the plant before the backup diesel generators start up [9]. 
This poorly designed experiment coincided with the design imperfections and the lack of 
experienced trained personnel led to the chain reaction in the core to run out of control. Several 
explosions occurred and caused severe damage to the steel and concrete lid/roof of the reactor. 
With the reactor containment damaged, a large amount of radioactive material was released into 
the atmosphere, where it was carried further by the wind and air currents in a very short time 
period. In addition, high temperatures in the reactor caused further melting of the remaining fuel, 
which caused prolonged radioactive emissions for weeks after the accident. It was estimated that 
the radioactive cloud released at the time of explosion was expelled kilometers high in the 
atmosphere. This was later carried by the winds over many European countries, first over 
Scandinavian countries, then changing direction of the air currents contaminated Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, southern parts of Germany and Austria. Finally, South and Southeast winds 




accompanied by rain showers led to contamination of Balkan countries [10]. It is approximated that 
the total amount of radioactive release was 5300 PBq (1015 Bq), 200 hundred times higher than 
radioactivity released in Hiroshima with most of the radioactive fallout dispersed over Belarus, 
Ukraine, and Russia.  
  
1.3.3 Fukushima Daiichi Accident 
Brief progression of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident that led to the containment failure: 
On March 11, 2011, a severe earthquake occurred off the coast of Japan with the epicentre about 
180 km away from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP. This generated a tsunami which caused devastating 
damage over the whole nuclear site, composed of six BWRs. Three of the six reactors were in 
operation at rated power output before the event, while the other reactors had been in an outage. 
It was noted that the automatic shutdown protocol (SCRAM) worked as it was designed. The 
earthquake and tsunami caused a loss of all offsite power. Due to the loss of all external electric 
power sources, the emergency diesel generators automatically started, but with the tsunami 
impact, all the operational diesel generators were lost including the back-up batteries due to 
flooding. The lack of AC or DC power supply to the vital operation of decay heat removal systems 
caused the fuel of the operational nuclear reactors to suffer total and partial melting damage. 
A large amount of hydrogen was released as a consequence of the zirconium-steam reaction, 
resulting in strong explosions damaging the containment buildings of some of the units. This 
depiction is illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Fukushima Daiichi containment building before and after a hydrogen explosion [11] 
The Fukushima accident occurred due to the failure of the cooling system at the nuclear power 
station. This, as a resultant from the 4th largest earthquake recorded in the world since 1900 [12] 
and the subsequent formation of high tsunami waves that hit the Fukushima NPP which damaged 
the electrical network and emergency diesel generators on site.  This lack of electrical power supply 
implied the loss of all forced circulation or cooling of the nuclear reactors and spent fuel pools.  
In contrast to Chernobyl, the Fukushima reactors were equipped with a concrete containment 
building. The explosions at Fukushima were solely of a chemical nature (hydrogen explosions) and 
affected the reactor containment buildings but, based on the best available information, not the 
reactor pressure vessels or the reactors themselves. The release characteristics were different from 
the Chernobyl accident. Releases of only gas phase radionuclides occurred in the course of venting 
operations to relieve the over-pressure inside the vessel which took place approximately one day 
after the shutdown. In comparison to the uncontrolled, continuous releases of Chernobyl with peak 
releases at the beginning of the accident, the venting operations at Fukushima NPP happened in 
pulses over a time period of more than a week, and were often conducted under advantageous 
weather conditions. 
From the beginning, the Chernobyl accident was proclaimed as a major accident, according to the 
International Nuclear Events Scale (INES) level 7 event, which is the largest scale accident, which 




endangered the environment and population. The Fukushima Daiichi accident did not arise 
suddenly, but developed over several days. This accident resulted in the highest number of human 
casualties and destruction in Japan since World War II. Problems on the NPP began after the 
devastating earthquake of magnitude 9 and tsunami which followed. TEPCO, the operator of the 
Fukushima NPP, in June 2011 reported to the IAEA estimating the quantity of radiation released into 
the atmosphere by the accident to be approximately 15 percent of the radiation released from the 
Chernobyl incident [12]. 
 
1.3.4 Westinghouse 3-loop PWR type power plant design  
Nuclear technology and the use of nuclear reactions to produce electricity in NPP were established 
in the early 1950’s. The most common types comprise the use of enriched uranium isotope (U-235) 
with light water as moderator and coolant. Two designs exist for the method used with enriched 
uranium, namely the PWR and the BWR type. The other concept utilises natural uranium with heavy-
water (water enriched in the deuterium isotope) as coolant and moderator. Fundamentally, all 
designs utilise the release of nuclear energy to generate heat, which is used to produce steam which 
is then used in steam turbines to produce electricity.  
Some NPP like KNPS utilises the Westinghouse 3-loop PWR plant design. The Westinghouse PWR 
power producing operation is comprised of three independent closed cycles or loops which includes 
the primary, secondary, and tertiary loops as can be seen in Figure 8 below.  
The primary loop contains the nuclear fuel core, primary pumps and pressuriser. The heat source 
consisting of the nuclear fuel core positioned within a reactor vessel. The energy generated from 
the controlled fission reaction is converted into sensible heat in the moderator. The 
moderator/coolant is pumped to the steam generator where the heat is transferred to a secondary 
loop through a number of U-tubes, depending on the steam generator design. The reactor coolant 
then returns to the reactor vessel. The pressuriser connected to the primary loop maintains a 
pressure above the saturation pressure by means of electrical heaters and cooling water sprays to 
prevent bulk boiling. 





Figure 8: Simplified Schematic Diagram of Westinghouse PWR Nuclear Power Plant [6]  
 
The secondary loop is the heat utilization cycle where dry steam produced in the steam generator 
flows to a turbine-generator where it is expanded to convert thermal energy into mechanical energy 
and produce electrical energy. The expanded steam exhausts to a condenser where the latent heat 
of condensation is transferred to the tertiary cycle cooling system and is condensed. The condensate 
from the condenser is pumped back to the steam generators. The tertiary loop is the heat rejection 
loop where the latent heat of condensation is rejected to the environment through the condenser 
cooling water [6]. 
As stipulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the safe operation of all nuclear 
installations is fundamental to protect and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy by the 
principle of highest nuclear safety. This is enforced and implemented by most nuclear installations 
with the incorporation of “Defence in Depth”. The concept of Defence in Depth (DID) limits the 
likelihood and the consequences of potential hazards by the implementation of prevention, control 
and mitigation measures to ultimately protect both the workers and the public [13].  
Defence in Depth consists of an ordered deployment of different levels and redundancy of 
equipment and procedures in order to maintain the effectiveness of physical barriers placed 
between radioactive materials, workers, and the public or the environment. This must be ensured 
in normal operation, anticipated transients and accident conditions at the NPP.




2. Literature review 
Since the inception of utilising nuclear power as a commercial energy source, safety and the safe 
design, construction, operation and decommissioning of these installations was highlighted as of 
primary importance. In light of this overriding concern for safety, dismissing the possibility of an 
accident resulting in the release of radioactivity to the environment has been thoroughly 
investigated and analysed. Probabilistic risk assessments indicate that accidents of this nature are 
highly improbable but not negligible with severe consequences. The accident at Three Mile Island 
Unit 2 demonstrated that significant core melting can occur in a commercial nuclear power reactor 
after losing the first of the three physical barriers of radioactivity. The reactivity-driven explosion at 
Chernobyl showed that all three barriers can be breached and the public exposed to high levels of 
radioactivity [13]. A severe accident as with Chernobyl requires the failure of multiple safety systems 
and the breach of all three physical barriers to the release of radioactivity: fuel cladding, reactor 
cooling system, and the containment.  
To maintain the integrity of the containment building, it is important to mitigate a severe accident 
involving significant core degradation, where the melted core could react with coolant and 
structures, thereby preventing the continuous generation of steam, hydrogen and other radioactive 
gases. Eventually, the containment building would be compromised by overpressure due to the 
release of these gases if the designed safety systems do not operate as intended [14]. One of these 
severe accidents is a LOCA. A LOCA is a Design Based Accident (DBA) where the primary system 
inventory is lost as a result of a break in the primary piping. The consequences of a LOCA are 
potentially catastrophic and the mitigation thereof necessitates the employment and incorporation 
of multiple emergency safeguard systems. During accidents, the last barrier to the radioactive 
products before release into the atmosphere is the containment building. The IAEA for this reason 
requires from all NPP operators to design their containment system to ensure or contribute to 
achieving the following safety functions as a minimum requirement [15]: 
 Confinement of radioactive substances in operational states and in accident conditions, 
 Protection of the plant against external natural and human induced events, 
 Radiation shielding in operational states and in accident conditions. 
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Thus, protecting the last barrier becomes fundamentally important in all operating conditions. Two 
of the most critical installations and enhancements to nuclear containment building vessels for 
incident management are containment water spray systems and CFVS.  
2.1 Containment spray system 
The main function of a containment water spray system is to reduce the temperature, pressure and 
airborne contamination inside the containment building, following an accident which may challenge 
the containment integrity. The containment spray system provides a high-pressure, finely divided 
water spray to the containment atmosphere located in the top parts of the containment building. 
Heat transfer to the droplets and subsequent condensation of atmospheric steam can produce rapid 
reductions in temperature, pressure, aerosol and fission product concentrations [13]. The spray 
droplets, as well as much of the condensate, will collect in a sump at the bottom of the containment. 
Generally, the initial spray water is taken from a water storage tank. When this source is exhausted, 
water is pumped from the sump, through a heat exchanger, back to the spray nozzles.  
Westinghouse designed a containment spray system with 2 independent trains with redundancy in 
mind to limit offsite and site boundary doses following the unlikely event of a LOCA [16]. 
Redundancy refers to the use of more than one or the minimum requirements to fulfil a given safety 
function, for example the minimum number of pump sets or equipment to fulfil a given safety 
function. This is an important design principle for achieving high reliability in systems important to 
safety, and eliminating the single failure criterion requirements for safety systems. Redundancy 
permits the failure or unavailability of at least one set of equipment to be tolerated and allowed 
without loss of the system function [17]. In addition, the containment spray system can also be used 
for containment fire protection for widely spread fires inside the reactor building. This use is 
however limited to certain reactor power levels. 
Borated water supplied to the containment spray system is pumped via independent trains to the 
spray headers inside the containment building, where it is atomized through spray nozzles. This 
atomizing spray increases the water surface area available for heat transfer. The fine water 
mist/droplets also provide nucleating sites to condense any steam generated. As the spray droplets 
absorb heat, the temperature of the saturated steam decreases and the containment pressure 
decreases. 




The water supplied to this system can be chemically treated or dosed for multiple reasons. At KNPS 
tri-sodium phosphate (TSP) is added to the containment spray system to maintain the pH above 7. 
The Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for TSP can be found in Appendix B. The benefit of 
maintaining the pH above 7 includes: 
 Ensuring the released iodine remains in solution, and prevents any significant release of 
iodine from the sump during recirculation. (Note: Iodine is produced in the fission reaction 
from the parent product Tellurium (132Te). The iodine remains in the fuel element during 
normal operation due to containment of the fuel matrix and fuel cladding.) 
 The long-term corrosion rate of galvanized steel, aluminium and zinc-based coatings is 
minimised. 
 The minimum pH of 7 is recommended to protect stainless steel from chloride stress 
corrosion cracking. 
The containment spray system can be placed in service either manually or automatically when 
containment pressure increases to a predetermined setpoint of 240 kPa gauge, in the KNPS case. It 
is ultimately responsible to protect the integrity of the containment structure from the threat of 
failure, due to over pressurisation from the energy released by the primary system in the event of a 
pipe break (LOCA). 
 
2.2 Containment Filtered Venting Systems (CVFS) 
CFVS is an accident management system designed to minimise and control the release of fission 
products when relieving the pressure of the containment building in the case of a severe nuclear 
accident. The basic idea of a filtered venting system is to open a controlled flow path via a 
radioactive nuclide filtration unit to the external environment in order to relieve the build-up of 
pressure caused by steam and non-condensable gases generated inside the containment building 
structure. By doing this, it is possible to delay or prevent structural failure of the containment 
building. It also provides additional time to mitigate the accident and reduces the offsite 
consequences compared to those produced by containment failure [18]. A filtered venting system 
is designed to remove the exhaust produced in the containment building during a postulated core 




melt accident. In this case, the exhaust could be composed of gases of H2, O2, N2, steam, CO, CO2 
and radioactive aerosols. There are two main types of CFVS:  
 Dry, which utilizes a gravel or sand-bed filter, 
 Wet, which uses a scrubber in a liquid solution. 
 
Both allow the removal of most of the aerosols (including cesium, >99.9%) and iodine (>99% in 
elemental form) contained in the vented atmosphere [19]. 
Different kinds of filtered venting designs were investigated in the 1980s with different filtered 
venting strategies following the Chernobyl accident. Several European countries installed 
containment filtered venting systems with no consistent set of technical specifications. This was all 
based on the nuclear operator requirements. Similarly, after the Fukushima Daiichi accident the 
needs analysis highlighted the importance of the containment building function, and containment 
filtered venting to be considered for severe accident conditions. This was based on the results of 
the national stress tests conducted and submitted by the end of 2012 with binding action plans to 
increase the robustness of their nuclear plants against beyond design events. [20] 
Young et al. [14] modelled a Station Blackout (SBO) accident scenario on a South Korean designed 
two-loop 1000 MWe PWR Generation II nuclear reactor (OPR-1000), developed by Korea Hydro and 
Nuclear Power (KHNP) and Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO).  An accident analysis for the 
OPR-1000 under a SBO was conducted using the MELCOR computer code. An SBO accident is where 
onsite and offsite electrical systems do not work or are lost. It is assumed that the emergency core 
cooling systems such as High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) and Low Pressure Safety Injection 
(LPSI) are not operational during the accident. At the start of the SBO, the reactor and turbine are 
tripped, the pumps for the Main Feed Water (MFWs) and Auxiliary Feed Water (AFWs) are stopped, 
and the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) is closed.  





Figure 9: Pressure variations in containment under an SBO accident scenario. [14] 
 
The model also incorporated the inclusion of a proposed containment filtered venting system vessel 
taking suction directly from the containment building. The results of the model can be seen in Figure 
9 above, where a solid line indicates the pressure over time transformation in the containment 
building with a CFVS, while the broken line represents the atmosphere thermohydraulics in the 
control volume of the CFVS vessel and the water saturation temperature at the pressure of the 
control volume of the CFVS, respectively. The containment pressure rapidly increases over time 
without the CFVS or other intervention leading to design and failure limits. It can be observed that 
pressure increases well above that of the specified 4 bar gauge design pressure of most current 
containment building designs. 
In the scenario where the safety systems are operable at approximately 500 kPa the CFVS system 
activates passively. It is observed that the pressure and temperature are rapidly decreased and 
brought under control with the activation of the CFVS. Consideration to factors that will influence 
the behaviour and the integrity of any nuclear containment building, include: 
 Corrosion or any other Aging Mechanisms  
 Chemical reactions with CO2 (carbonation of the concrete) 
 Fragility curve of the steel (ASME code for the temperature effect) 
 Damage due to impact with internal or external missiles/objects, etc. 
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In PWR’s a postulated LOCA will incite the reactor vessel to depressurise and may cause the core to 
be uncovered or trigger boiling of the primary system inventory. For this reason, accurate 
knowledge and understanding of the flow rate of the coolant through a pipe break during a LOCA 
accident are very important. Similarly, this will be indicative of the rate of containment pressure 
build up or increase and the selection of reactor safety components. 
In a similar study, Sang-won Lee et al. [18] analysed and modelled containment over-pressurisation 
scenarios (both SBO and large break LOCA) using the MAAP4 computer code on an OPR1000 large 
dry containment PWR in Korea (1000 MWe). Parameters and values for this study are seen in Table 
1. In this OPR1000 design, the ultimate containment failure pressure with a 5% probability 95%
confidence level was determined to be 1.01 MPa. 
Table 1: Initial and boundary conditions for containment over-pressurisation scenarios in Korean 
simulation [18]. 
Parameter Values 
Reactor power 2815 MWth 
CTMT net free volume 7.73 × 104 m3 
CTMT design pressure 0.5 MPa 
CTMT ultimate pressure 1.01 MPa 
CFVS opening/closing set-point 0.9 / 0.6 MPa 
0.5 / 0.2 MPa 
CFVS flow rate 17 kg/s @ 0.9 MPa 
10 kg/s @ 0.5 MPa 
The CFVS is modelled as a junction/penetration connecting the containment upper compartment to 
the environment with an assumed flow diameter to be 230 mm (9 inch) and flow resistance through 
the CFVS is considered. To activate the CFVS, the nuclear facility can opt for either containment 
isolation valves which will be opened either by the operator (active means) or by rupture disc 
(passive means) when the set point is reached. A decontamination factor of 1000 for aerosol was 
assumed in this analysis.  




The three cases investigated in this study were: 
 Case 1: without venting, 
 Case 2: with cyclic venting at severe accident pressure of 0.9 MPa / 0.6 MPa (CFVS-9 case),  




Figure 10: Containment pressure history in LBLOCA and extended SBO scenarios [18] 
 
From Figure 10, the results indicate that during the initiating time period, the containment pressure 
continuously increases due to the break steam flow rate to the containment. Large amounts of 
steam generated and primary system water flow into the containment vessel. Similarly, hydrogen 
and non-condensable gases are steadily generated by molten core concrete interaction in the base-
mat. The containment pressure reaches its ultimate pressure at approximately 53.8 hrs in Case 1 
without venting. 
In the venting cases (CFVS-9 and CFVS-5) the initiating scenarios proceed and the containment 
pressure increases to the point where the CFVS starts to operate. Then, the containment pressure 
rapidly decreases to the closing set-point of 0.6 MPa and 0.2 MPa respectively.  




Radiological release to the environment is reduced to 10−3 considering the decontamination factor. 
In addition, the cyclic venting strategy can reduce the noble gas release by 50% for 7 days [18]. This 
is important as noble gases, such as radioisotopes of krypton and xenon that are produced by fission 
that are highly radioactive and is relatively difficult to confine as they occur in gaseous form, are 
chemically inert, and are relatively insoluble in water. It can be established from the above studies 
and models that the type of CFVS will affect the thermal load and operating conditions of the 
particular containment building during and after the postulated accident scenarios. Consequently, 
the different types and designs of CFVS methods will be evaluated. 
2.2.1 CFVS types and designs 
As discussed previously there are two main types of CFVS namely a Dry CFVS, which utilises a gravel 
or sand-bed filter and a Wet CFVS system, which uses a scrubber in a liquid solution. 
Wet CFVS systems like the Westinghouse wet-metal design used by all Swedish NPPs take suction 
from the containment building and are guided by piping system to an opening/inlet into the 
scrubber tank full of water. The Swedish nuclear fleet utilises a Multi Venturi Scrubber System 
(MVSS) [21]. The major component is a scrubber system comprised of a large number of small 
venturi scrubbers submerged in a water pool. Radioactive aerosols and gaseous iodine separate 
from the containment gas mixture and are contained in the water pool.  Venturis are ideally located 
on different levels and are sealed off by the internal water level. The number of engaged venturis is 
proportional to the pressure in the containment and so the total relief flow, thus achieving high 
decontamination factors over a wide flow ranges. The cleaned and non-condensable gases are 
purged from the scrubber and released via a filter room to the atmosphere.  This design is illustrated 
in Figure 11.  





Figure 11: Wet CFVS system design principle [22] 
The Dry CFVS method is a venting system that can consist of either one type of filter or a 
combination of two of the following:  
 A metal fibre filter that retains airborne radioactive aerosols  
 A sand bed filter  
 Industrial cartridge filter with pleated sintered fibre 
 A molecular sieve with doped zeolite for chemisorption of gaseous radioactive elemental 
iodine and its organic compounds.  
 
Similarly, the Dry CFVS takes suction from the containment by means of an isolation valve and/or 
rupture discs and piping system to the inlet of the filter unit. This corresponds to the Westinghouse 
dry CFVS system with the addition of a separator/pre-filter, preventing water droplets from entering 
the CFVS. This can be situated inside the containment building. The venting system can be actuated 
either remotely by opening containment isolation valves or by a rupture disc, depending on 
regulatory and/or customer requirements. The Dry CFVS method can be seen in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: Schematic view of a Dry filter method for CFVS of aerosol filter inside containment [22] 
Due to the increasing demand for revised nuclear safety culture and OE in the nuclear field over the 
past 30 years, CFVS developing companies like Areva (the multinational organization specializing in 
nuclear power) are  incorporating designs that utilise both wet and dry CFVS methods.  [23] 
Figure 13: Areva FCVS design [23] 
In Figure 13, the three stages of the combination type CFVS produced by Areva are distinctly noted. 
Stage 1, the venturi scrubber stage (wet stage), is comprised of a set of venturi nozzles submerged 




in a scrubbing liquid. The vented gas from the containment atmosphere enters the first stage where 
increased dynamic pressure of the vented gas causes the static pressure to decrease. This way it 
provides adequate absorption time and the bulk mixing of the scrubbing liquid. This stage will retain 
most of the elemental iodine and large quantities of iodine compounds [23]. Stage 2, metal fibre 
filter stage (dry stage), is comprised of a droplet separation and micro-aerosol filtration section. This 
stage will retain exhaust gases downstream of the venturi nozzles, suspended droplets and re-
suspended aerosol from the scrubbing liquid. From this section, gases are moved to Stage 3, the 
molecular sieve section (dry stage) via throttling orifices. In this section, the remaining gaseous 
organic iodine is removed via adsorption on a molecular sieve adsorbent, which reacts under high 
temperatures to yield high iodine retention percentages. Subsequent to this stage the treated 
gaseous waste is expelled via a filter room or stack system.  
 
2.3 Passive Autocatalytic recombination 
Following a LOCA, hydrogen gas will accumulate in the containment building, due to the 
temperature generated within the reactor coolant system. Nuclear stations like Koeberg Nuclear 
Power Station (KNPS) need to measure the hydrogen concentration in the containment atmosphere, 
adequately mix the containment atmosphere to avoid accumulation of hydrogen at the top of 
containment structure and to keep the hydrogen concentration low enough (less than 4,1%) to 
prevent any risk of ignition of the hydrogen-oxygen mixture. Hydrogen is highly flammable and 
when mixed with air at certain concentrations could cause an explosion. These flammable regions 
for hydrogen are between 4% and 75% (burning limits) and between 13% and 60% (explosive limits).  
During and following a LOCA, hydrogen accumulation can be the result of production from the 
following sources: 
 Zirconium-water reaction, 
 The corrosion of metals caused by the containment spraying solution,  
 Radiolytic decomposition of the cooling water (which includes core solution radiolysis and 
sump solution radiolysis). The radiolysis of water occurs during normal plant operations as 
follows: 
2H2O ⇌ 2H2 + O2 
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After a LOCA, however, the dominant direction of the reaction is towards the formation of H2 and 
O2 gas, prompted by gamma radiation from decaying fission products and other radioactive sources. 
Hydrogen is produced when zirconium in the core cladding reacts with steam according to the 
following equation: 
Zr + 2H2O ⇒ ZrO2 + 2H2 
The hydrogen produced in this manner is released to the containment atmosphere in the first few 
minutes after the accident occurs. 
To prevent this hydrogen build-up during a LOCA, KNPS and Tricastin NPP have Passive Autocatalytic 
Recombiners (PAR) installed inside their containment buildings. Detailed hydrogen analysis for a 
beyond design based accident (BDBA) was performed, together with the analysis of the best suited 
location for these PAR units at the French station of Tricastin. The basic concept of the PAR 
recombines hydrogen and oxygen to form water vapour (H2O) or steam. The catalyst enables the 
recombination to occur at low temperatures and low hydrogen concentrations and it is self-
sustaining until the H2/O2 concentration is insufficient to sustain the reaction. The recombination 
process is an exothermic reaction and this heating causes convection driven flow due to reduced 
gas density above the catalytic plates relative to the gas density below the catalytic plates. 
The PAR units are constructed of stainless steel with a drawer containing the Platinum-Palladium 
catalyst coated plates at the lower end. This can be seen in Figure 14.  





Figure 14: Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner design [24] 
 
The recombination process starts when gas mixtures containing between 1% to 2% hydrogen come 
into contact with the catalyst coated plates. The hydrogen and oxygen reacts chemically on the 
surface of these plates and is exothermic, generating steam in the process. Thus keeping the 
hydrogen concentration lower then the flammable concetration range. Testing shows that the 
hydrogen concentration of the gas mixture will be reduced to approximately 0,5% (volume) at the 
outlet of the PAR unit. The depletion rate of hydrogen is dependent on the containment pressure 
and the amount of air, H2, steam, carbon monoxide and other gases in the mixture. 




3. Model formulation and data collection 
3.1 Research Methodology 
The overall methodology for this research was structured around the case study of the KNPS 
containment integrity following a double-ended guillotine break LOCA. This was based on literature 
reviews and previous studies done on various containment buildings such as Young et al. [14] and 
Sang-Won Lee et al. [18]. The basic understanding of a PWR containment building design and 
requirements was evaluated. This was closely followed by considering emergency safeguard 
systems that will support the containment building integrity following an accident event. These 
technical evaluations include:  
 Design features and requirements for containment buildings 
 Containment spray system 
  Passive auto-catalytic recombiners  
 Design features of CFVS 
 Different CFVS type comparison  
 Calculations: 
o Model heat up rate in a LOCA  
o Containment pressure and temperature absorption capability  
Data collection was performed using the KNPS engineering simulator. This was done due to the 
complex nature in a rapidly changing atmosphere in the event of a LOCA to ensure accurate data 
compilation. For this to occur the following were evaluated:  
 Understand computer code/simulator used at KNPS 
 Simulate system response based on the same input data with different systems and 
electrical power availabilities  
 CFVS incorporation to current KNPS PWR system to cater for “black swan events” like 
Fukushima Daiichi scale event 




Results were presented in basic graph format due to the amount of data gathered and can be 
requested from the author for further scrutiny. 
 
3.2 Simulator (Koeberg engineering simulator) 
With the rapid change and complex nature of the containment atmosphere during transients and 
accidents the KNPS engineering virtual simulator was utilised to obtain the data for the scenarios.   
The simulator is a predictive computer code mainly utilised at the NPP as a training tool for Reactor 
Operator licencing and requalification purposes. This is a licence binding requirement from the 
National Nuclear Regulator (NNR). The NNR is the South African nuclear regulatory body responsible 
for all frameworks to protect people, the environment and property from any harm and damaging 
effects of ionizing radiation and the risks associated with a specific facility or activity of handling 
radioactive material. To comply with this licencing requirement guide set out by the NNR, the 
minimum functional requirements of the simulator are set out but not limited to this. The simulator 
program yields little to no difference in response compared to the actual unit response under 
normal and abnormal operations. The software has the capability of mathematical modelling, 
operating system and utilities design report generation, detail algorithm, general description and all 
source coding [25].  
The simulation boundaries should clearly be identified as the simulator goes into a state where it 
will “freeze” (where the dynamic simulation is interrupted and remains static until taken out of this 
mode) when the simulation parameters go beyond that of actual system failure. This occurs as the 
simulator is not a BDBA code and is not designed to give an output when the analysed system goes 
beyond failure. For this reason, the containment pressure limit used was the design pressure of 500 
kPa gauge. Similarly, the hydrogen generated during the simulation of the LBLOCA was accepted to 
remain below 4% (below risk of ignition concentrations) for all the simulations as the PARs are 
passive devices that are incorporated in the simulator code and cannot be disabled or removed.  
 




3.3 Onset conditions for the simulation 
This dissertation assumes the following scenario, a severe earthquake occurs off the coast of Cape 
Town close to the KNPS which generates a tsunami, with waves in excess of 15 m in height. The 
Earthquake also causes a double ended guillotine break (LBLOCA) on the cold leg of the primary 




Consider a PWR such as KNPS with a primary circuit pressure of approximately 15.4 MPa gauge and 
the containment pressure comprised of non-condensable gases and air at 96 kPa (abs). To 
determine the effects of a postulated accident that will increase the containment pressure, 
temperature and atmosphere rapidly, the following scenarios/ cases were looked at: 
 Scenario/case 1: LOCA with one emergency diesel generator  
 In the initial stage, the containment pressure will increase rapidly due to the coolant (water) being 
released from a high pressure primary pump discharge pipe break and flashing to steam. In the 
second stage (normal plant response), offsite power supply is lost with the exception that one 
emergency diesel generator is operable and available. The passive and safeguard systems will be 
actuated as per normal plant response. 
 Scenario/case 2: LOCA with station blackout conditions 
 The initiating stage will occur (LOCA), but then no engineered safety system is activated. We assume 
that the electrical and battery room levels are flooded, rendering equipment inoperable.  Thus, 
allowing the containment building pressure and temperature to increase to design parameters and 
can be assumed to reach failure or uncontrolled release conditions.  
 Scenario/case 3: LOCA with station blackout conditions, with CFVS  
The initiating stage and pressure increase occur (same as in scenario 2) in the containment building 
with the activation of an included containment filtered venting system.  




Assuming a CFVS passive actuation at 300 kPa (g) and closes at 200 kPa (g) with an extraction 
flowrate of approximately 15 kg/s.  
The containment pressure increase stage of the case study can be mathematically calculated per 
unit time incorporating the initial containment pressure. The fluid leaking from the postulated LOCA 
break is a two-phase mixture due to the primary system operating parameters. Using the Brunell 
critical flow rate for two-phase flow in short channels, the resulting pressure,  Pt , [26] : 
 
   𝑃𝑡 =  𝑃𝑆 +  𝑃𝑎                               (1) 
and   𝑊 = 𝐴𝑛√ [2 𝑔 𝜌𝑃 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡 (1 − 𝑐)]     (2) 
 
Where:  
𝑃𝑡 = Resulting total pressure 
𝑃𝑠 = steam pressure 
𝑃𝑎 = air pressure 
W = critical mass flow rate 
𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡 (1-c) = pressure at exit from the pipe break/ nozzle 
𝜌𝑃 = Water density at specific pressure 
𝐴𝑛 = break/nozzle area 
Assuming the mixture from the break will convert to wet steam in the containment free space and 
can be written by the energy balance: 
               𝑊 [𝐻 + 𝐶𝑝𝑆  (𝑇ℎ −  𝑇𝑚)] + 𝑀𝐶𝑝𝑎(𝑇𝑎 − 𝑇𝑚) =  (𝑊 + 𝑀) ∗  
(𝐶𝑝𝑠+𝐶𝑝𝑎)
2
∗ (𝑇𝑚 − 𝑇𝑎)  (3) [26] 
Model Assumptions: 
 The initial velocity of the fluid in the pipe is zero (0). 
 At time t =0 (sec) the flashed steam is considered dry saturated condition. 




 The coolant flow rate through the break/nozzle is unchanged for scenario 1 where the safety 
systems activate and the re-flooding of the core and primary system occur for approximately 
30 seconds. 
 Pressure in the pipe is unchanged for the containment pressure increase stage. 
 The water enthalpy in the pipe is unchanged during the blowdown period into containment. 
 Two main dimensional/directional components of water velocity at the break nozzle exist. 
One in the direction of the fluid flow (u1) and the other is perpendicular to the first (u2). Thus 
giving: 
𝑢1 =  
?̇?
𝐴.𝜌𝑃
                   𝑢2 = √[
2𝑔 (𝑃𝑛− 𝑃𝑎)
𝜌𝑃
]     
 
This gives the kinetic energy of the water: 
                                                                             𝑢 =  √((𝑢1)2 +  (𝑢2)2) (4) 
 
The kinetic energy of the steam is determined from the steam mass flow rate (W.X). The steam 
velocity becomes: 





As both water and steam possess kinetic energy and enthalpy and the break will increase these in 
the containment and the energy balance in containment becomes: 
 
𝑊 (1 − 𝑋)[(𝐾𝐸)𝑊 + 𝐻𝑊 + 𝐶𝑝𝑊  (𝑇ℎ −  𝑇𝑐)] + 𝑊. 𝑋 [(𝐾𝐸)𝑆 +  𝐻𝑆 + 𝐶𝑝𝑆  (𝑇ℎ −  𝑇𝑐)] +
𝑀𝐶𝑝𝑎(𝑇𝑎 −  𝑇𝑐) =  (𝑊 + 𝑀) ∗  
(𝐶𝑝𝑠+𝐶𝑝𝑎)
2
∗ (𝑇𝑐 −  𝑇𝑎)  (6) [26] 
 
The above equation gives the new containment temperature after the pipe break occurs and will 
provide the new pressure assuming the air and steam properties stay unchanged during the one 
second time step.  
Input data used for a typical Westinghouse PWR like KNPS can be seen in Appendix A, Table 4. 




3.4 Comparison between different CFVS designs 
The combination type CFVS system proves how industry requirements differ from operating unit to 
unit, therefore the selected design will have to meet a number of unit-specific criteria. Criteria can 
range from CFVS performance, geographical location to economic viability. A comparison of 
different CFVS designs and operational functionality was drawn up in Tables 2 and 3 below from 
various literature sources. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of advantages and disadvantages of wet and dry Containment Filtered 
Venting systems [22] [23] [27] [28] [29] 
Type Wet CFVS system design Dry CFVS system design 
Supplier/ 
Examples 
 Westinghouse Wet-Metal fibre 
 Areva 
 CCI 
 Westinghouse Dry design 
 Sand bed filter (utilised by French 
PWR’s) 
 Gravel bed 
 
Advantages 
 Scrubbing of steam/gas through 
solution (retaining particles) 
 Chemical addition for high iodine 
retention 
 Predictable behaviour with respect to 
residual heat capacity 
 High duration of operation without 
intervention 
 Very high retention rates 
 Modular design and compactness 
 Passive operation  
 Little to no maintenance required 
after installation 
 Uses sand beds or stainless steel fibre 
filters 
Disadvantages  Droplet separation necessary 
 Re-suspension risk 
 Limited fine aerosol retention 
 Need control and operator 
intervention 
 High filter blockage probability 
 No decay heat transfer ability 
 No mixed aerosol removal capability 
 Ability compromised at altered 
pressures 
 
Apart from Table 2 and the listed disadvantages, it is important to note the possible overall 
disadvantages of including any CFVS to the design and safety margins of the plant. Some of these 
include early actuation and actuation method failure.  




The disadvantage of the early venting actuation in an accident is that depressurisation occurs at a 
time when the fission product level in the containment is still high. On the other hand, when the 
isolation path, i.e. rupture disk or isolation valve fail, would compromise the containment boundary, 
if not detected, it will lead to an uncontrolled release to the environment. 
Another factor to consider is the CFVS extracting effluent flow from the containment building may 
result in a possible hydrogen concentration/ build-up in the vent line and possibly increasing the risk 
of hydrogen combustion in the venting lines [22].  This can be limited by nuclear operators with the 
inclusion of hydrogen recombining processes and equipment for a severe accident. 
The advantages and disadvantages do not make the wet or dry type of CFVS suitable but would be 




















Table 3: Comparison of the important characteristics of 4 designs of Containment Filtered Venting 
systems [22] [23] [27] [28] [29] 
Types of CFVS 
Designs Westinghouse Dry 
Westinghouse Wet-
Metal fibre (MVSS) 
Areva 






Modular metal fibre 
filter and molecular 
sieves 
 
Submerged venturi and 
metal fibre filter 
 
Submerged venturi, 









N/A Sodium Hydroxide, 








Natural convection of 
filter only 
High, depending on size of 
vessel 
High, depending on size 
of vessel 
High, depending on 
size of vessel 
Venting duration Limited by metal fibre 
filter size and capacity 
Limited by design and 
metal fibre filter size and 
capacity 
Limited by design and 
metal fibre filter size and 
capacity ( the need to 
recirculate to 
containment) 
> 1 year ( depending 
on customer 
specification and 





> 10 000 at limited 
aerosol load capacity 
> 10 000 at limited aerosol 
load capacity 
> 10 000 at low aerosol 
concentration and load 
capacity 





> 3300 ( if molecular 
sieves are pre-heated) 
otherwise >1000 
> 1000 >100-200 >1000 
 
From Table 3 the comparison of the 4 different CFVS designs were tabulated. The characteristics 
and values between the 4 CFVS designs were comparable but were dependant on the type and 
design required by the PWR and BWR. They also varied due to the actual design of the CFVS and 
what their main purpose for installation was. 




The main characteristics of interest were, for eg. the filtration process and the decay heat capacity. 
From Table 3 we observed that the filtration process differed between the 4, but 2 were similar 
using a submerged venturi design. The scrubbing chemicals were mostly the same and the decay 
heat capacity of the dry CFVS used natural convection of the filter only where the other 3 had a high 
decay heat capacity. It could also be observed that the venting durations differed between the 4 
designs, the aerosol decontamination factors were all the same at >10000, the elemental iodine 
decontamination factors were different between the 4 designs, showing that the dry CFVS worked 
better at reducing the iodine contamination at >3300, with the lowest value observed from the high 








4. Results and Discussion 
In this study, one of the most dangerous accidents in a NPP was investigated, namely a LBLOCA on 
the cold leg of the primary system. This accident was selected to model a Fukushima Daiichi scale 
event and investigate the response to a BDBA. The determined values of the peak containment 
pressure, temperature and consequently the capability of the containment to maintain its integrity 
following the LBLOCA were obtained. In the simulation on the Koeberg simulator, it was assumed 
that no operator actions were performed throughout the accident scenarios. 
 The initial conditions for the scenarios can be seen in Appendix A, Table 4 with the pipe break 
initiated at time t = 0 seconds. The data was gathered and resultant data and graphs can be observed 
in Appendix B. 
 
4.1 Scenario 1 (LBLOCA with one train emergency diesel 
generator set available) 
 
Figure 15: Containment pressure vs. Time for LBLOCA with one Diesel Generator available 
 






Figure 16: Containment temperature vs Time for LBLOCA with one Diesel Generator available 
 
 
Figure 17: Core level vs Time for LBLOCA with one Diesel Generator available 
 




In scenario 1, the pressure in the containment building rapidly increased and reached a maximum 
pressure of 4.135 bar (abs) within 70 seconds. This also occurs with the other 2 simulated scenarios 
reaching 4.011 bar (abs) for scenario 2 (LBLOCA with SBO conditions) and 4.135 bar (abs) for 
scenario 3 (LBLOCA with SBO conditions with a simulated CFVS) at 54 seconds.  
The availability of at least one emergency diesel generator signifies the possibility and capability of 
a safe shutdown by means of supplying electrical power to the safeguard equipment like 
containment spray system, reactor safety injection system and auxiliary shutdown systems. With 
these systems in operation, it can be seen that the containment pressure is being controlled and 
reduced to less than 2.5 bar(abs) after 15 minutes.  
It is also reinforced in Figure 17, where the drop in reactor level from approximately 12,8 m (on level 
instrument RCP600MN) and the stabilisation to approximately 7.2 m in 120 seconds after the 
postulated incident is observed. RCP600MN is the instrumentation for measuring the reactor core 
level in meters during normal and accident operating conditions. Borated water is pumped from the 
refuelling water storage tank to keep the fuel subcritical and remove residual heat. The containment 
temperature peaked at approximately 126.8 oC from the containment temperature of 44.62 oC. It 
later decreased steadily to below 105 oC after 12 minutes.  
 
Figure 18: Core temperature profile for LBLOCA with one Diesel Generator available 




The simulation for scenario 1 was stopped after 15 minutes, as the results continued to 
decrease/improve thereafter. This as the plant shutdown process was initiated and the cooling and 
safety systems were on recirculation mode removing residual heat from the core, protecting the 
containment integrity by means of containment sprays and emergency coolers, etc.  
 
4.2 Scenario 2 (LBLOCA with SBO conditions) 
 
Figure 19: Containment pressure vs. Time for LBLOCA with SBO conditions 









Figure 21: Core level vs. Time for LBLOCA with SBO conditions 





Figure 22: Core temperature profile for LBLOCA with SBO conditions 
 
In simulation scenario 2 the containment pressure peaks at 4.011 bar (abs) after 54 seconds. 
Consequently, the pressure starts to decrease steadily to approximately 3 bar (abs) after 660 
seconds (11 minutes) where it stabilised just before another rapid increase in pressure occurred. 
This stabilisation is solely due to the pressure absorption capability of the containment structure / 
building. This can be explained with the calculated heat and pressure capacity of the containment 
below.  
Containment pressure load handling capability:  
Mass (𝑚):                                            𝑚𝑅𝐶𝑃 = 𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 =  
𝑣𝑅𝐶𝑃
𝑣𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡
  = 137228.261 kg (7) 
𝑣𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 @ 315°C = 0.001472 
𝑚3
𝑘𝑔
    [ASME tables] 
Energy:                                               𝑚(ℎ𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 −  ℎ𝑅𝐶𝑃) =  𝑄𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡
𝑅𝐶𝑃 − 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡
𝑅𝐶𝑃  (8) 




Assuming no heat/energy gained or lost, no work done for state 1 to state 2, i.e. the moment before 
and after the rupture of the primary pipe.  
 




At 400 kPa (from ASME table):                 𝑥 =
𝑢𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡−𝑢𝑓
𝑢𝑓𝑔
 = 0.302 (10) 
Where:  𝑥 = wetness fraction  
 𝑣𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 =  𝑣𝑙 +  𝑥. 𝑣𝑔 = 0.1407 
𝑚3
𝑘𝑔
                                                   (11) 
 𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛 =  𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡. 𝑣𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 = 19308.016 𝑚
3                                          (12) 
 
Therefore, the minimum containment volume for the pressure not to increase above 400 kPa (abs) 
(4 bar (abs)) is 19308.016 𝑚3. The KNPS containment free space volume is 49500 𝑚3, which is well 
above the minimum required volume to maintain the pressure at 400 kPa. 
 
 
Figure 23: Vaporisation and thermohydraulic effects inside containment vessel following a LOCA 
 
At the integer/input of 870 seconds, the core level was observed, in Figure 21, to deteriorate below 
3 meters, shortly after which the simulation concluded due to the simulated system reaching failure 
limits. This is a consequence of no residual heat removal (water adding capability) from the reactor 
core. At this point it was evident that the reactor core was uncovered and the fuel started melting 







400 kPa  
400 kPa  




4.3 Scenario 3 (LBLOCA with SBO conditions and assimilated 
CFVS) 
 
Figure 24: Differences in CFVS exhaust for 10 kg/s and 15 kg/s penetration 
 
 
Figure 25: Containment pressure profiles for different CFVS extraction flowrates 





Figure 26: Containment temperature profiles for different CFVS extraction flowrates 
 
 
Figure 27: Containment pressure vs. Time for LBLOCA with SBO conditions including assimulated 
CFVS (extraction rate of 15 kg/s) 





Figure 28: Containment temperature vs. Time for LBLOCA with SBO conditions including 
assimulated CFVS (extraction rate of 15 kg/s) 
 
 
Figure 29: Core level vs. Time for LBLOCA with SBO conditions including assimulated CFVS 
(extraction rate of 15 kg/s) 





Figure 30: Core temperature profile for LBLOCA with SBO conditions including assimulated CFVS 
(extraction raet of 15 kg/s) 
 
In scenario 3 a containment penetration point, located in the upper part of the containment vessel, 
was used as an outlet point with a flow rate of approximately 15 kg/s to simulate a CFVS. Altering 
the extraction flow rate from the containment building was also investigated and the results can be 
seen in Figures 24 to 26 using the flowrates of 10 kg/s and 15 kg/s. The temperature and pressure 
profiles generated from this resulted in similar outputs with the more significant difference being 
noticeable in the final containment pressure. Here it is noticeable that the containment 
temperature profile is identical with very little end result by changing the extraction flowrate, thus 
changing the size of the CFVS had no effect on the temperature profile of containment. The 
containment pressure profile, however, was clearly influenced by the sizing of the CFVS. The peak 
containment pressure for a 15 kg/s extraction CFVS system was 4.06 bar (abs), whereas the peak 
containment pressure for a 10 kg/s extraction CFVS was 4.135 bar (abs). The pressure to which the 
simulation descended before failing also differed for the two venting extraction rates. The higher 
venting extraction rate yielded a lower peak containment pressure. This would be desired to ensure 
that the containment building is not over-pressurised past its integrity. The smaller extraction rate 
yielded a higher peak containment pressure but only by 3%, where the extraction rate was changed 
by 50%. The analysis showed the containment exhaust flow is directly related to the containment 




pressure. It can be seen in Figures 31 and 32 where very little changed in the containment pressure 
and temperature can be compared to that of scenario 2. This could be due to the consequences of 
the rapid rate of change of the containment atmosphere conditions compared to the small 
extraction rate of the simulated CFVS extraction flow rate.  
The difference between scenario 2 and scenario 3 can be seen in Figures 19, 27 and 31, where the 
maximum pressure produced after the break at time integer of 54 seconds was recorded at 4.011 
bar (abs) and 4.135 bar (abs) respectively. Even though with a higher peak pressure sustained with 
scenario 3 (with an assimilated CFVS) the containment pressure reduces faster than that of scenario 
2 and decreases to 2.93 bar (abs). This occurs after 13 minutes at which point the simulation reaches 
failure. To understand this occurrence, observe Figure 30 detailing the reactor core temperature 
profile for scenario 3.  It was observed in seconds after the break and the loss of primary inventory, 
the core temperature rapidly increased. This also occurred in scenarios 1 and 2. This is a result of 
the reactor core voiding as it goes through a phase of departure from nucleate boiling. The negative 
void coefficient of reactivity of the PWR forces the reactor to go subcritical and shutdown causing 
the temperature to decrease. This can be seen in Figures 18 and 22 for scenarios 1 and 2 
respectively.  
With little cooling to the core and stored energy being released, the nuclear fuel and the cladding 
start heating up and the core temperature start increasing. The principle of this phenomenon 
following a LBLOCA can be seen from literature in Figure 34, Appendix C. This occurred with 
scenarios 2 and 3, with the only differences being the time at which the effects occur. Stored energy, 
known as decay heat is generated by:  
 Energy released as the products of the fission process continue to decay, 
 Energy released from fission caused by delayed neutrons, and  
 Energy released from the decay of neutron capture products such as Uranium-239 and 
Neptunium-239. (Uranium-238, through the absorption of a neutron and the emission of a 
quantum of energy known as a gamma ray, becomes the isotope Uranium-239. Over a period 
of time (approximetaly 23.5 minutes), this radioactive isotope loses a negatively charged 
electron, or beta particle; this loss of a negative charge raises the positive charge of the atom 
by one proton, transforming it into the element Neptunium-239. Neptunium-239 in turn 
undergoes beta decay, thus gets converted into Plutonium-239.) 




The core level profile for scenario 3 is observed to have the initial drop in level from 12.84 m to 3 m 
after 52 seconds. Here it stabilises and starts increasing to 7.16 m after 120 seconds. This is a 
resultant from the reflooding of the primary system from the safety injection system accumulators. 
This is followed by the gradual decrease in level caused by the loss of inventory via the pipe break. 
This occurs until the core level decreases below 5.8 m and the simulation ends.  
 
4.4 Summary of results 
The different scenario results was superimposed to visibly analyse the differences per unit time 
following the LBLOCA. This is represented in Figures 31, 32 and 33. When the pressure curve for 
scenario 1 (LBLOCA with one train diesel generator available) was compared with the pressure curve 
for scenario 2 (LBLOCA with SBO conditions), together with temperature response profile in scenario 
2, the significant effect from the containment spray system on the containment atmospheric 
temperature is clearly noticeable. This is visible in Figure 31. This coupled with the alleviating effect 




Figure 31: Containment pressure comparison of all simulation results 




The other noticeable difference between scenario 2 and 3 is the point at which the simulation or 
the system failed. Scenario 3 with the assimilated CFVS system continued until 905 seconds, 
whereas scenario 2 ended only after 884 seconds before system failure. 
It can be seen in Figure 31 indicated by the containment pressure measuring instrument, ETY101MP, 
that the pressure increases rapidly after the onset of the postulated incident scenarios for all the 
simulation scenarios. This is identical for the temperature profile of containment measured with 
temperature transmitting instrument, ETY002MT. This is due to the release of large volumes of 
water and water flashing to steam as a result of the double-ended pipe break in the primary system. 
 
 
Figure 32: Containment temperature comparison of all simulation results 
 





Figure 33: Core level comparison of all simulation results 
 
Correspondingly, the reactor core level can be seen to decrease rapidly after the initial break in 
Figure 33. This is followed by a sudden increase in core level. The continuous flooding of the primary 
system from the passive safety system like the safety injection system accumulators contributes to 
the above occurrence when the pressure decreases below a predetermined value. 
Literature suggests two of the most critical installations/enhancements to nuclear containment 
buildings/vessels for accident management are reliable water injection via sprays and containment 
filtered venting. The results obtained from the KNPS engineering simulator for the three selected 
LOCA scenarios supports this theory. With at least one operable emergency diesel generator 
functioning on the affected unit, the reactor unit can be safely be controlled and shutdown. This 
would be with the postulated LBLOCA releasing large amount of water and steam into the 
containment building.  
It was observed following the accident input signals to the simulator, that the containment pressure 
and temperature increased to a maximum value of 4.137 bar (abs) and 126.8 oC respectively. The 
pressure and temperature of containment rapidly increased within 2 minutes to their respective 
thermodynamic peaks due to the high energy released from the pipe break in the primary system. 




This was followed by a prompt decrease in containment pressure and temperature, mathematically 
determined by the containment load handling capability.  
The results indicated that the large dry containment design at KNPS (free space volume of 49 500 
m3) is well above the minimum required volume (19 308.016 m3) to maintain the containment 
pressure below 400 kPa in any operating or incident scenario. This was followed by a flattened 
pressure profile gradient.   
Since the construction of the plant, there have been multiple modifications to the systems inside 
the containment building. These will influence the given free space volume and in turn the 
consequential pressure during transient and accident conditions.  
Scenarios 2 (LBLOCA with SBO conditions) and 3 (LBLOCA with SBO conditions, with an assimilated 
CFVS) resulted in identical pressure and temperature trend profiles with scenario 1 (LBLOCA with 
one train emergency diesel generator set available) in contrast which yielded a faster and better 
alleviating outcome due to the effect of the safeguard systems actuation, i.e. the containment spray 
system.  
The core level data (Figure 17 and 33) also reinforced the effect of the safeguard system actuation/ 
operational with scenario 1, where it was evident how the reactor primary level decreased (from 
12.8 m) with the initial loss of primary inventory but stabilises between 7 m and 6 m after only 140 
seconds.  
With scenario 2 the initial drop in core level occurred as a result of the pipe break in the primary 
system, followed by the reflooding of the core plenum by the safety injection accumulators which 
are passive safety equipment (same as scenario 1). However, without any electrical power supplying 
the safeguard system in scenario 2, no borated water make-up is possible and the core level starts 
deteriorating gradually with time. This was followed by a prompt drop in level after 14 minutes to 
below 3 m, shortly after which the simulation concluded due to the simulated system reaching 
failure limits.  
The reactor core temperatures for the scenarios with the explanatory descriptions of the 
instruments and their respective functional location in the core can be seen in Appendix B. Figure 
22, the core temperature profile for scenario 2, also indicated the sudden increase in core 




temperature after approximately 10 minutes. Suggesting the reactor core was uncovered and the 
fuel started melting with the likelihood of catastrophic failure.  
In scenario 3 a containment penetration point was used as an outlet/extraction point with a flow 
rate of approximately 15 kg/s to simulate a CFVS. The containment pressure and temperature 
profile observed for the simulation incorporating the CVFS mimics that of scenario 2 as the onset 
conditions are identical, with the difference of the extraction flow from containment. Figures 31 and 
32 iterated the little change in the containment thermohydraulic properties compared to that of 
scenario 2. This indicating the rapid rate of change of the atmosphere conditions compared to the 
small extraction rate of the simulated CFVS extraction flow rate. This indicated the requirement to 
investigate the size and effectiveness of the selected CFVS system based on specific BDBA, i.e. a 
performance based probabilistic risk and safety analysis.  
The results suggested the use of a CFVS will be more effective in a gradual over-pressurisation 
incident compared to a rapid over-pressurisation like a LBLOCA.  
The core temperature for scenario 3 is also seen to reach the maximum output for the in-core 
instrumentation quicker than the other scenarios resulting in system failure.




5. Conclusions and recommendations 
This dissertation evaluated the integrity of the PWR containment building as the last barrier 
following a severe accident, i.e. LBLOCA. This was stimulated after the accident at the Fukushima 
Daiichi NPP in 2011, which prompted the consideration and requirement to manage severe 
accidents especially in older generation NPP, like KNPS. At Fukushima, the inability to provide 
consistent reactor core cooling and reliable containment venting resulted in the final radiological 
barrier failure and direct release of radioactive nuclides to the surrounding environment.  
During the simulated LBLOCA, large volumes of water flashing to steam escaped from the pipe break 
in the primary system. The pressure and temperature of the last barrier increased rapidly in the first 
2 minutes following the break. This was followed by a steady decrease in these parameters based 
on the containment load bearing capability. This corresponds with studies done on other nuclear 
containment buildings, i.e. Young et al. [14] and Sang-won Lee et al. [18]. It was also observed in 
Figures 15 and 16 the effects of the containment spray system as a safeguard engineered feature 
reducing the containment building pressure and temperature in a LBLOCA. In addition, the inclusion 
of a CFVS and its effects was noticed and is evident in Figures 31 and 32. Here it was seen that the 
CFVS decreased the containment pressure at a faster rate, but is dependent on the size and 
effectiveness of the CFVS unit. It was also determined that a CFVS would be more effective in a 
gradual over-pressurisation incident compared to a rapid over-pressurisation like a LBLOCA. This 
was due to the rapid rate in change of the containment atmosphere conditions associated with a 
LBLOCA.  
In conclusion, the objectives of this dissertation study were met by evaluating literature and 
obtaining an understanding of the basic construction of the generation III PWR nuclear containment 
building and its purpose, as well as developing a thermodynamic model based on the LOCA 
simulation results for the containment temperature and pressure changes. The dissertation also 
examined the two important severe accident management installations to a nuclear containment 
building, i.e. containment spray system and CFVS. From the simulation data, it was seen that the 
containment spray system will effectively aid in reducing the temperature and pressure inside the 
containment building following a LBLOCA, whereas the CFVS only affected the overall pressure 




inside containment. The wet and dry type CFVS were also evaluated in terms of advantages and 
disadvantages as well as the design characteristics of four different CFVS designs. 
The results and graphs obtained in literature were similar to those obtained in the 3 simulated 
scenarios but may have differed due to plant-specific data and design of KNPS which was used as a 
case study.  
With the inclusion or installation of CFVS, it is important to be mindful that it comes with its own 
consequences. This includes the risks of inadvertent actuation and damage from external hazards 
since the CFVS is situated outside containment. Likewise, more gaps identified, that must not be 
overlooked include: 
 Vent Initiation and flow rate capacity 
 Aerosol, iodine and radioactive nuclide loads and characteristics during BDBA 
 Hydrogen accumulation inside CFVS 
 Duration of operating CFVS unmanned 
 Heat removal capability of the CFVS 
 
Recommendations for future study include acquiring and using a simulation tool that is capable of 
evaluating beyond design based accident scenarios. Further studies looking at the radioactive 
nuclides released during and after a severe accident like a LBLOCA, as well as the efficacy of the 
incorporated CFVS to a PWR. The selection criteria and performance based matrix for this selection 
of a CFVS. 
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Appendix A.  
Input data used for simulation of accident scenario (typical 
Westinghouse PWR like Koeberg NPP) 
Table 4: Initial conditions for LOCA model in case study 
Initial conditions of the high pressure pipe Value Units 
Inner diameter  0.74 m 
Initial pressure of water 154 bar 
Initial temperature of water 280 °C 
Volumetric flow rate of water 6.1 𝑚3/s 
Initial volume of water 202 𝑚3 
 
Containment initial conditions   
Pressure 0.96 bar 
Temperature 30 °C 
Steam dryness fraction 1  
Spray system water temperature  20 °C 
 
Boundary conditions   
Spray system injection pressure 15 bar 
Volume of containment building 49500 𝑚3 
Rate of water injection 785 𝑚3
ℎ𝑟
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Appendix B.  
Koeberg Simulator data and results for the scenarios 
 
Table 5: Scenario specified data for engineering simulator 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Simulated CFVS No No Yes (15 kg/s and 10 
kg/s) 
Passive Accumulator Safety 
Injection 
Yes Yes Yes 
Passive Hydrogen absorption 
(PARs) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Diesel reload signal allowed (1 
diesel) 
Yes No No 
Safety systems activated 
(containment spray and safety 
injection systems etc) 
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Table 6: Scenario data and results 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Peak Containment Pressure (bar) 4.135 (at 70 s) 4.011 (at 54 s) 4.135 (at 54 s) 
Peak Containment Temperature (oC) 126.8 inconclusive Inconclusive 
Containment Integrity maintained Yes Inconclusive Inconclusive 
Time to failure (maximum) 15 minutes 11 minutes 13 minutes 
Operator actions none none Optional 
Minimum reactor core level (m) 7.2 m at 120 s 3 m at 870 s 3 m at 52 s 
Maximum core temperature Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive 
Note: Pipe break or LBLOCA initiated at time, t=0.
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The Core temperature instrumentation information: 
 Unit :    oC 
 Range:  Minimum = 0 
             Maximum = 350 
 Instrument functional location:    - RCP028MT/ RCP044MT = Reactor in-core outlet temperature  
  - RCP029MT/ RCP43MT = Reactor in-core inlet temperature 
  - RCP055MT = Reactor hot leg (SG inlet temperature) 
  - RCP056MT = Reactor cold leg (Reactor inlet temperature) 
Scenario 1: 
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Scenario 2:  
 
Figure 3522: Core temperature profile for LBLOCA with SBO conditions 
Scenario 3: 
 
Figure 3630: Core temperature profile for LBLOCA with SBO conditions including assimulated CFVS 




Figure 34: Pressure and temperature change history of a Westinghouse PWR fuel rod following a 
LBLOCA [30] 
